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Background: To contain the spread of COVID-19, a cordon sanitaire was put in place in Wuhan prior to the Lunar
New Year, on 23 January 2020. We assess the efficacy of the cordon sanitaire to delay the introduction and onset of
local transmission of COVID-19 in other major cities in mainland China.
Methods: We estimated the number of infected travellers from Wuhan to other major cities in mainland China
from November 2019 to February 2020 using previously estimated COVID-19 prevalence in Wuhan and publicly
available mobility data. We focused on Beijing, Chongqing, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen as four representative major
cities to identify the potential independent contribution of the cordon sanitaire and holiday travel. To do this, we
simulated outbreaks generated by infected arrivals in these destination cities using stochastic branching processes.
We also modelled the effect of the cordon sanitaire in combination with reduced transmissibility scenarios to
simulate the effect of local non-pharmaceutical interventions.
Results: We find that in the four cities, given the potentially high prevalence of COVID-19 in Wuhan between
December 2019 and early January 2020, local transmission may have been seeded as early as 1–8 January 2020. By
the time the cordon sanitaire was imposed, infections were likely in the thousands. The cordon sanitaire alone did
not substantially affect the epidemic progression in these cities, although it may have had some effect in smaller
cities. Reduced transmissibility resulted in a notable decrease in the incidence of infection in the four studied cities.
Conclusions: Our results indicate that sustained transmission was likely occurring several weeks prior to the
implementation of the cordon sanitaire in four major cities of mainland China and that the observed decrease in
incidence was likely attributable to other non-pharmaceutical, transmission-reducing interventions.
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Since late 2019, severe acute respiratory syndrome cor-
onavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), the causative agent of corona-
virus disease 2019 (COVID-19), has spread to over 114
countries and was declared a pandemic on 11 March
2020 [1]. Some countries have enacted cordon sanitaire-
type travel restrictions, either to prevent the export of
infections from an initial disease epicentre (such as Wu-
han in January 2020 [2] or Northern Italy in March 2020
[3]) to other countries and regions or to prevent the im-
port of infections from high-risk countries or regions
(such as the USA’s ban on travel from Europe [4]). Cor-
don sanitaires aim to curb the number of infected travel-
lers entering a region with a high proportion of
susceptible individuals, where they may seed additional
chains of transmission. However, historically, they at
best delay, rather than prevent outbreaks elsewhere [5].
Hence, the efficacy of cordon sanitaires in averting or
delaying outbreaks in other locations is an open
question.
Chinese authorities imposed a cordon sanitaire on the
city of Wuhan on 23 January 2020 [2] and extended the
travel restrictions to the whole of Hubei province by 26
January 2020 [6]. The restrictions were imposed 1 day
prior to the Lunar New Year (LNY) holidays and during
Chunyun, the 40-day holiday travel period that marks
the largest annual human migration event in the world
[7]. At the same time, other public health interventions,
such as physical distancing, were also enacted across
China [8].
This study aims to assess the impacts of the cordon
sanitaire around Wuhan, the epicentre of the COVID-
19 pandemic, on reducing incidence and delaying out-
breaks in other well-connected large population centres
in mainland China. We used publicly available mobility
data based on location-based service (LBS) provided by
Baidu Huiyan, to construct four mobility scenarios.
Combined with daily estimated prevalence of COVID-19
in Wuhan before 11 February 2020 by Kucharski et al.
[9], we simulated the daily importations of infected trav-
ellers to Beijing, Chongqing, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen
to assess the risk that they would cause sustained local
transmission.
Methods
Estimating number of infected travellers
We obtained daily prefecture-level human mobility data,
expressed by a relative index scale, for mainland China
from Baidu Huiyan for both the 2019 and 2020 travel
periods surrounding the LNY, known as Chunyun. The
platform aggregates mobile phone travel data from an
estimated 189 million daily active users, processing >
120 billion daily positioning requests mainly through
WiFi and GPS [10].We examined the proportions of the total outflow
leaving Wuhan and entering all other prefectures in
China (excluding Wuhan). We then selected Beijing,
Chongqing, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen for further ana-
lysis as major population centres with substantial travel
with Wuhan and a wide geographic spread. We assume
that the early transmission dynamics of SARS-CoV-2 in
cities of this size were similar to that in Wuhan.
To estimate the absolute number of daily travellers
leaving Wuhan, we assumed that each unit of Baidu’s
migration index corresponds linearly to 50,000 travellers.
This was chosen as the most credible value after synthe-
sising evidence from several sources [8, 11–14] (see
Additional file 1: Supplementary Appendix 1).
We calculated the total number of daily travellers leav-
ing Wuhan and entering each city by taking the product
of the scaling factor, the total daily outflow index from
Wuhan, and the daily proportion of travellers from Wu-
han entering the four cities. Daily estimated COVID-19
prevalence in Wuhan was retrieved from the exposed
(incubating) and infectious compartments of a published
SEIR model on the early dynamics of COVID-19 trans-
mission in Wuhan [9]. We estimated the number of
daily infected arrivals in a destination city as a Poisson
process governed by the daily number of travellers and
prevalence in Wuhan (Additional file 1: Supplementary
Appendix 2). Each day, we simulated this arrival process
100 times to capture the uncertainty in the process; this
represents 7100 samples for the 71 days for each city in
each scenario. We assumed that individuals would travel
regardless of their infection status, and Wuhan was the
sole source of infected individuals and populations
within destination cities mixed homogeneously.
We examined four travel scenarios (Table 1): Sce-
nario 1 is based on the observed travel pattern in
2020 and represents the Chunyun period with cordon
sanitaire introduced on 23 January. Scenario 2 repre-
sents a counterfactual travel pattern used to evaluate
how the COVID-19 outbreak would spread if no cor-
don sanitaire was implemented. This was based upon
the actual travel from Wuhan for the equivalent Chu-
nyun period in 2019. In scenario 3, we synthesised a
hypothetical travel pattern to represent a typical non-
Chunyun period with cordon sanitaire introduced on
23 January, using outward travel flow on representa-
tive non-Chunyun days in 2019. Scenario 4 is a vari-
ation on scenario 3 in which no cordon sanitaire was
implemented.
We extended the corresponding outflow time series to
the early stages of the outbreak (22 November 2019), by
assuming the outflow from Wuhan to equal to the aver-
age daily outflow on representative non-Chunyun days,
whilst accounting for weekday effects. The pairwise
travel flow proportions between Wuhan and each other
Table 1 Scenarios describing different possible travel patterns out of Wuhan used in simulations
Scenario Time of the year Source year Cordon sanitaire imposed Observed/hypothetical
1 Chunyun 2020 Yes Observed
2 Chunyun 2019 No Observed
3 Non-Chunyun 2019 and 2020 Yes Hypothetical
4 Non-Chunyun 2019 No Hypothetical
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ary and 1 March, 2020, so an approximation of the gen-
eral flow magnitude was used for dates outside of the
observed range (22 November–31 December) and in
simulated aspects of our scenarios, i.e. Chunyun affected
travel days in non-Chunyun scenarios. A more detailed
description of how each scenario was formulated is in
Additional file 1: Supplementary Appendix 3.
Branching process transmission model
As cases in China during the early epidemic were likely
underreported [15], we used a stochastic branching
process model to simulate outbreaks in each of the four
cities. Consistent with the prevalence estimates from
Wuhan [9], we began simulating travel from Wuhan on
22 November 2019 and calculated incidence up to 1
February 2020. For each simulated infected arrival in
each city on a given day, an independent branching
process is generated, with:
 A negative binomial offspring distribution with a
time-varying mean effective reproduction number
(Re) with baseline 2.2 [16] and overdispersion (k,
variability in the number of secondary cases result-
ing from an infected case) of 0.1 [17]
 A log-normal serial interval (SI) with mean of 4.7
days and standard deviation of 2.9 [18]
We assume that in the initial phases of the epidemic
(prior to the cordon sanitaire), the effective daily
reproduction number (Re) was 2.2 [16, 19]. The date at
which the probability of sustained transmission exceeded
a threshold of 95% (i.e. an outbreak occurring) given Re
of 2.2 and k = 0.1 was used to evaluate the effect of travel
restrictions (details in Additional file 1: Supplementary
Appendix 4) [20]. A sensitivity analysis for k using the
lower and upper bounds from Endo et al. [17] (0.04, 0.2)
and H1N1-like (2.0) [21] overdispersion in Re is shown
in Fig. 4. We also perform a sensitivity analysis on the
serial interval, using a gamma-distributed SI of mean
7.5 days and standard deviation of 3.4 days [19] (Add-
itional file 1: Figure S3 and S5) [18, 22]. To simulate the
effect of local non-pharmaceutical intervention measures
(NPIs) such as physical distancing and workplace and
school closures in addition to travel restrictions [23], we
compare Re = 2.2 in the absence of interventions (nochange, unmitigated local outbreak), to 1.1 (50% reduc-
tion, slowing epidemic, Re > 1), or 0.55 (75% reduction,
suppressing epidemic, Re < 1). We assume additional in-
terventions took effect on the same date as the introduc-
tion of the cordon sanitaire, 23 January 2020.
Implementation
All analyses were carried out using R version 3.6.2. The
branching process model was implemented using the
package projections version 0.4.1 [24].
Results
Effect of the cordon sanitaire on mobility
A gradual increase in the outflow from Wuhan in the
weeks prior to the LNY was observed in both 2020 and
2019, exemplifying the Chunyun period (Fig. 1). Com-
paring the 23 days prior to the introduction of the cor-
don sanitaire in scenarios 1 and 2, we estimate daily
outflow was 21.7% (95% CI 9.78–33.6%) higher in 2020
than the equivalent period in 2019. A surge in volume in
the 3 days preceding the cordon sanitaire can be seen in
scenario 1 (2020), where an estimated 1.69 million left
Wuhan, in line with other estimates [8]. A similar out-
flow immediately before the LNY observed in scenario 2
(2019) suggests the surge cannot necessarily be attrib-
uted to upcoming travel restrictions. This is further
reflected by the 22.5% between-year increase during this
3-day window not being substantially greater than the
average daily outflow increase.
The cordon sanitaire had a stark effect on reducing
the total outflow from Wuhan. Comparing the mean
daily outflow in the 23 days preceding restrictions with
the 23 days after, volume fell by 92.7%, from 345,000
(95% CI 299,000–390,000) average daily travellers to 25,
300 (95% CI 8590–42,000). In comparison, volume fell
by 30.2% during the equivalent period in 2019 from 290,
000 (95% CI 252,000–328,000) to 203,000 (95% CI 177,
000–228,000). After restrictions were imposed, travel
volume declined to a low plateau over 5 days, during
which approximately 330,000 people left. On the lowest
day (3 February), we estimate 10,500 people left Wuhan,
which likely represents only essential journeys.
In our hypothetical scenarios, we simulated the out-
bound flow with the additional travel volume due to
Chunyun removed. By comparing scenarios 2 and 4 dur-
ing Chunyun (10 January–18 February, 2020) we
Fig. 1 Total domestic travel outflow from Wuhan under 4 travel pattern scenarios
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ellers left Wuhan every day because of Chunyun.
We found that in all but one prefecture with over 7
million inhabitants, the cordon sanitaire on 23 January
did not substantially change the time at which sustained
transmission was likely to occur (Additional file 1: Figure
S1 A-F), but the picture was more mixed in smaller cit-
ies. Of the four representative major cities selected for
further analysis, during their pre-restriction travel phase
in scenario 1 (1 January–23 January, 2020): Beijing expe-
rienced a high volume of travel with approximately 1510
(95% CI 1200–1820) mean daily travellers from Wuhan;
Chongqing had the highest at 1650 (95% CI 1320–1970);
Hangzhou received relatively fewer with 451 (95% CI
362–541); and Shenzhen had a medium travel volume
from Wuhan with 820 (95% CI 664–976) mean daily
travellers.
Effect of the cordon sanitaire on importations of infected
persons to other major Chinese cities
We estimate infected individuals began arriving on a
daily basis in other major population centres in mid-
December in scenario 1 (observed Chunyun travel pro-
file and cordon sanitaire imposed) (Fig. 2). The estimated
median number of infected arrivals on a given day
peaked prior to the travel restrictions at 37 (95% uncer-
tainty interval (UI) 26–47) in Beijing, 95 (95% UI 77–
115) in Chongqing, 13 (95% UI 6–19) in Hangzhou, and
33 (95% UI 23–44) in Shenzhen. Travel restrictions re-
duced the number of infected arrivals to below 1 in allfour cities within 2 days (Fig. 2a). In scenario 2 (Chu-
nyun travel profile without cordon sanitaire), the num-
ber of daily infected arrivals decreases slightly after the
Chunyun travel period (Fig. 2a). In cities with popula-
tions below 7 million, infected individuals began arriving
later, so the cordon sanitaire may have acted to delay or
prevent the arrival of infected individuals (Add-
itional file 1: Figure S1 A-F).
In scenario 3 (non-Chunyun with travel restrictions),
the estimated number of daily infected arrivals is mar-
ginally lower than scenario 1, peaking at 35 (95% UI 25–
46) in Beijing, 39 (95% UI 28–50) in Chongqing, 11
(95% UI 5–17) in Hangzhou, and 25 (95% UI 15–34) in
Shenzhen.
Effect of the cordon sanitaire on outbreaks in other major
Chinese cities
Due to the volume of outbound travel from Wuhan in
scenario 1, we estimate that sustained local transmission
was likely to have already occurred in the four cities in
early January, several weeks prior to the introduction of
the cordon sanitaire (Table 2). On the date travel restric-
tions from Wuhan were imposed, local infections were
likely to be in the thousands in the four cities (Table 2).
Outbreaks started later and were smaller on the date of
the shutdown in Hangzhou and Shenzhen compared to
Beijing and Chongqing, which reflects the relative vol-
ume of travel from Wuhan.
No substantial difference was observed in the daily
incidence in the scenarios with and without travel
Fig. 2 a Estimated median number of daily infected arrivals and b estimated cumulative number of infected arrivals from Wuhan for the four
chosen cities (Beijing, Chongqing, Hangzhou, and Shenzhen, left to right) for Chunyun vs. non-Chunyun and cordon sanitaire imposed vs. no
cordon sanitaire. The shaded area indicates the 95% uncertainty interval. The vertical dashed line indicates the date the cordon sanitaire
was imposed
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taire was imposed on 23 January; there were enough
infected people to sustain local transmission in the
absence of imported infections (Fig. 3 and Add-
itional file 1: Figure S4). After the implementation of
the cordon sanitaire on 23 January, the trajectory of
the epidemic is determined primarily by reductions in
Re to simulate local transmission-reducing interven-
tions. In an unmitigated outbreak where Re remains
at 2.2, incidence continues to increase exponentially
in both scenarios; with Re reduced to 1.1, incidenceTable 2 Estimated number of local infections in each of the four cit
date the cordon sanitaire was imposed
Prefecture-
level city





Shenzhen 271 (147–457)steadies; and with Re reduced to 0.55, incidence de-
creased towards zero. The incidence after 23 January
did not differ in scenarios with or without the imple-
mentation of the cordon sanitaire, and no additional
effect was observed due to the cordon sanitaire after
reducing Re.
No substantial differences were observed in the esti-
mated cumulative number of infections by 1 February
with and without cordon sanitaire in any of the four cit-
ies, after accounting for uncertainty resulting from the
importation process and variability in the number ofies of interest in the baseline scenario on 23 January 2020, the
n, Cumulative number of locally transmitted infections by 23 January





Fig. 3 Median daily incidence of COVID-19 (shaded areas indicate 50% and 95% confidence intervals) in Beijing, for Chunyun vs. non-Chunyun
and cordon sanitaire imposed (red, solid) vs. no cordon sanitaire (blue, dashed) and for varying values of the effective reproduction number Re,
where Re = 2.2 (no change, unmitigated local outbreak), reduced from 2.2 by 50% to 1.1 (mitigation of outbreak, Re > 1), and 75% to 0.55
(suppression of outbreak, Re < 1)
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persion) (Fig. 3).
Decreasing the overdispersion parameter k from the
baseline 0.1 to 0.04 [17] results in a delay to the likely
date of an outbreak (Fig. 4); despite this, an outbreak
was highly probable in all four cities prior to the date of
the cordon sanitaire. Increasing k to 0.2 [17], 0.54 [16],
and 2.0 (influenza-like) [21] further advanced the likely
date of an outbreak.
Discussion
By utilising publicly available mobility data to model the
spread of the outbreak from Wuhan to other large popula-
tion centres in China, we find that infected travellers from
Wuhan likely led to local transmission in other major Chin-
ese cities weeks before the cordon sanitaire. Cities with
more travellers from Wuhan likely experienced higher inci-
dence sooner. Modelling the trajectory of the outbreaks up
to 1 February, in scenarios with and without the effect of
the cordon sanitaire, we find no substantial differences in
the cumulative number of infections generated.By comparing Chunyun and non-Chunyun travel sce-
narios, no substantial difference was observed in terms
of the cumulative number of infections generated by 1
February. This is likely due to the consistently high vol-
ume of travel these cities receive from Wuhan year
round, resulting in enough infected travellers arriving to
seed chains of transmission even during a period of
regular travel volume. This however may differ in
smaller cities which receive highly seasonal influxes of
travellers from Wuhan relating to Chunyun.
The increase in mobility in 2020 compared to 2019
prior to LNY could be explained by a variety of factors,
including year-to-year variations and potential factors
related to COVID-19, such as the rumours of a rapidly
growing outbreak and impending travel restrictions. In
Northern Italy, a leaked COVID-19 plan might have
driven thousands to flee south [25].
Our simulated number of arrivals of COVID-19 infec-
tions for Shenzhen by late January is broadly consistent
with results shown in an observational study in Guang-
dong Province [26] (see Additional file 1: Supplementary
Fig. 4 Estimated date on which the probability of an outbreak exceeds 95% in the 4 cities of interest, for Chunyun vs. non-Chunyun and cordon
sanitaire imposed vs. no cordon sanitaire and for varying values of the overdispersion parameter k [15, 21, 22]. Median (and 95% CI) estimated
cumulative number of infections on 1 March in the four cities of interest, Chunyun vs. non-Chunyun, cordon sanitaire imposed vs. no cordon
sanitaire, and for varying values of Re, where R = 2.2 (no change, unmitigated local outbreak), reduced from 2.2 by 50% to 1.1 (mitigation of
outbreak, R > 1), and 75% to 0.55 (suppression of outbreak, R < 1)
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the simulated number of locally transmitted cases
around the same time is considerably higher than that
observed. This disparity could be explained by testing
programmes oversampling individuals with a recent
travel history from highly affected areas, inflating the
proportion of cases that were imported from outside
Guangdong and missing cases which obtained the virus
locally [30]. Furthermore, in scenarios when Re was set
to 0.55 after 23 January (Fig. 3 and Additional file 1: Fig-
ure S4), we also see case numbers decline at a similar
rate and timeframe to the epidemic observed in Guang-
dong [23], suggesting stringent local NPIs played a key
role in suppressing the outbreak.
In the formulation of the travel scenarios, we assumed
that the Baidu Huiyan mobility index values were relative
and linear and corresponded to 50,000 travellers per unit.
This was based on widely quoted estimates of people leav-
ing Wuhan and the inter-city capacity of the travel net-
work [8, 11–14, 31, 32] (Additional file 1: SupplementaryAppendix 1). However, the index may represent a differ-
ent number of travellers, or the scale may even be non-
linear and the result of a more complex function, but
without other evidence we assume linearity, as have other
studies [8, 13]. If we chose a higher scaling factor, similar
to ones used in other studies [12, 13], it is likely that in-
fected travellers would have arrived even earlier and in
greater numbers to the four destination cities. Addition-
ally, by reconstructing travel outflows for both dates out-
side of the observed range (22 November–31 December)
and simulated aspects of our scenarios, i.e. Chunyun af-
fected travel days in non-Chunyun scenarios, the actual
travel pattern may not have been accurately represented.
Further assumptions were also made surrounding the
pairwise travel flows, as observed data was only available
for 2020, and the travel flows between Wuhan and each
other prefecture-level city may have differed in 2019. We
only considered Wuhan to be the sole source of infected
individuals, and we only accounted for travellers making
single-leg journeys to their destination. As such, we may
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not considering the number of travellers which may have
stopped in an intermediate location, become infected, and
then arrived at the destination to seed local transmission,
or indeed infected travellers arriving from outside of Wu-
han. Hence, most of our assumptions likely underesti-
mated the number of travellers from Wuhan, and our
conclusions would likely be the same even if the true
number was higher. However, we also assumed that indi-
viduals would travel regardless of their infection status,
which may overestimate the number of infections in des-
tination cities.
In our model, we assume all chains of transmission are
independent and populations in each city mix homoge-
neously. These assumptions are likely only valid in the
early stages of an epidemic; however, as we only model
the initial introduction of cases and their contact net-
works, the effect of changing these assumptions is unlikely
to alter our conclusions. Moreover, the overdispersion
parameter k likely captures the spread of Re and acts to
counter the assumed homogeneous population mixing.
Reducing the overdispersion parameter k from 0.1 (~ 10%
of individuals responsible for 80% of transmission [17]) to
0.04 (~ 5% of individuals responsible for 80% of transmis-
sion) resulted in a delay to the date of an outbreak, yet not
past the date of the cordon sanitaire.
As recent studies have shown [8, 9, 33], strict physical
distancing measures soon decreased the effective
reproduction number to 1 or less in Wuhan and other cit-
ies in China. By incorporating this decrease into our model,
we find that cordon sanitaire alone, implemented after out-
breaks were likely to be established in other cities, was likely
ineffective in stopping or slowing outbreaks of COVID-19
in other major population centres. To have a greater im-
pact, the cordon sanitaire would need to be implemented
earlier, as investigated in [34, 16], and be accompanied by
other NPIs, such as general physical distancing and school
and work closures [8, 23]. Similarly, it is unlikely that cor-
don sanitaires in other countries with well-established, geo-
graphically dispersed outbreaks will substantially delay
COVID-19 spread. An open question is whether travel re-
strictions may be more efficacious to prevent or delay rein-
troductions after the lifting of other NPIs.
Whilst earlier restrictions on travel from Wuhan may
have had a larger impact, in countries with a high-
degree of inter-city travel, it may be difficult to imple-
ment such highly disruptive travel restrictions at an early
stage of the epidemic, before local transmission has oc-
curred in other cities. We find that local transmission in
the four cities we studied (here defined as the probability
of sustained transmission exceeding a 95% threshold)
was most likely established between 1 January and 8
January; it was only on 8 January that the aetiology of
the “mystery pneumonia” (which was not yet confirmedto spread from person-to-person [35]) was determined
as a novel coronavirus, and the first death occurred [36].
It is difficult to see how the cordon sanitaire could have
been justified any earlier, as almost every aspect of
COVID-19 virology and epidemiology was unknown.
Hence, it is likely that the sustained decline in COVID-
19 incidence in other cities of China several months into
the outbreak is primarily due to other public health
measures to reduce the disease transmissibility, i.e. to re-
duce the reproduction number to 1 or below [9, 23, 33].
The cordon sanitaire may have been more efficacious in
delaying outbreaks internationally, as the relative num-
ber of travellers is orders of magnitude lower [8, 37]; the
same may also apply to lower-traffic destinations from
Wuhan within China, such as small cities geographically
distant from Wuhan, as observed in Tian et al. [8]. We
found a mixed picture in these cities, where the cordon
sanitaire may have been more efficacious at delaying or
preventing outbreaks (Additional file 1: Figure S1 A-F).
However, COVID-19 transmission dynamics may differ
in comparison to large cities, and as such, we chose to
focus on the effect of travel restrictions in large cities
with large volumes of travel from Wuhan, where data on
R and k from the early outbreak in Wuhan are likely
generalisable. Furthermore, these destinations with low
traffic from Wuhan are more likely to be seeded by out-
breaks in other, comparatively closer, large cities first.
Hence, our assumption of a single outbreak source
would have been much less realistic.
Our estimated dates of introduction in other cities are
earlier than those observed [1] and reported in other
studies [38]. This is due in part to correction for under-
reporting, both by using the estimated daily prevalence
in Wuhan from Kucharski et al. [9], which is signifi-
cantly higher than the confirmed number of cases [20],
and by not relying on reported cases in other provinces.
The effect of underreporting is likely more pronounced
early in the outbreak prior to a well-defined case defin-
ition or widespread testing [15]. Hence, reconstructing
the early outbreak through a simulation approach was
more appropriate in this setting.
We concur with Tian et al. 2020 [8] that prohibiting
travel alone did not act to reduce the number of
COVID-19 infections in four major cities outside of Wu-
han or Hubei and that other local control measures were
likely instrumental in reducing incidence. Likewise,
Kraemer et al. [38] conclude that whilst a decrease in
the growth rate was observed in large cities after the cor-
don sanitaire was imposed, this is difficult to disentangle
from local control measures.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the introduction of cordon sanitaire-type
travel restrictions around a COVID-19 epidemic centre
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other well-connected population centres on its own
likely has little effect on altering their epidemic trajector-
ies. Stringent NPIs in cities are more likely to have a big-
ger impact in reducing incidence and pressure on
healthcare systems. Further research should examine the
role of travel restrictions during the partial lifting of
NPIs across China and elsewhere.
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